INTRODUCTION
Norms govern actions in all walks of life. For better or worse, we are capable of violating these norms and do so frequently. When we do break the rules, we are criticisable for breaking them. Sometimes, we are even deserving of blame. However, the latter is not always the case. Often enough we violate rules and still walk free of blame. The compulsive and small children are paradigm cases of blameless violators of norms.
While it is widely accepted that norms can be violated blamelessly, and while there is a pretty reasonable understanding of when this happens implicit in the literature, there are few if any explicit accounts.
1 This paper supplies this lack. Its first main ambition is to develop a normative framework for action in general including detailed accounts of criticisability, blamelessness and blameworthiness (section 1).
A specific type of action that has received a considerable amount of attention in recent epistemology is the speech act of assertion. Assertion is an action. And since actions in general are governed by norms, it will come as no big surprise that assertion makes no exception on this front. However, it is widely agreed that there is a norm associated with assertion in particular. More specifically, it is thought that there is an epistemic norm governing assertion. This means that there is such a thing as epistemic
Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy
permissibility and impermissibility for assertion. In particular, it is often thought that assertion is governed by a rule of the following form:
The C Rule of Assertion
One must: assert that p only if p has C. 2 While many contributors to the debate on norms of assertion subscribe to The C Rule of Assertion, there is no consensus on the identity of the crucial property C. According to the perhaps most prominent account, C is the property of being known by the speaker. In other words,
The Knowledge Rule of Assertion (KRA)
One must: assert that p only if one knows that p. 3 We accept KRA. Our second aim in this paper is to apply the normative framework to the case of assertion. We will argue that this allows its champions to defuse a prominent line of objection against KRA, which ventures to show that KRA's knowledge requirement on permissible assertion is too strong (section 2).
Finally, we will go even one step further and provide reason to believe that the argument against KRA can be turned on its head. With the normative framework from section 1 in play (and given a couple of further plausible assumptions), the cases that are supposed to show that KRA is too strong can be shown to confirm KRA and to disconfirm rival views.
I. CRITICISMS AND BLAME: A BASIC NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

I.1.$ Criticisability$ and$ Norm4Specific$ Blamelessness.$ It is widely acknowledged
in the literature that a permissible action is a blameless action. This applies at the level of specific norms such as the rule of Uno requiring players to call Uno when playing their penultimate card. If you do call Uno when playing your penultimate card, your action is permissible by this norm and so blameless relative to this norm.
Consider next a situation in which a particular norm is violated. Say, you played your penultimate card without calling Uno. You violated a rule of Uno. If so, you can, of course, be prima facie legitimately criticised for violating this norm. In the Uno case, we may do this for instance by saying: "You didn't call Uno!"
Even so, it may be that you violate a norm and yet you are blameless for so doing.
If so, you are also, of course, blameless relative to this norm. More specifically, there are three ways in which this may happen.
One way of blamelessly violating a particular norm is through overriding. 4 This happens when the requirements of the norm you are violating are in conflict with the requirements of another norm that takes precedence in the situation. With regard to the second and the third way of blamelessly violating a norm, some qualifications are needed. To see why, suppose that you knew that you would undergo brainwashing were you to go back to your guru. You had also promised not to go back. However, you went anyway. The impermissible act you are made to perform may be out of your control. Even so, you are blameworthy (see below) for another act, going back to your guru, of which the impermissible act is a consequence. As a result, you are not blameless for violating the rule of Uno. Strictly speaking, then, lack of control excuses only when it is itself blameless.
Similarly, suppose that, in our toy case, you had promised to read up on the rules of Uno before playing but did not do so. In this case, you are unaware of the relevant rule of Uno. Even so, you are blameworthy for another act (in this case an omission), your failure to read up on the rules of Uno, of which your failure to call Uno is a consequence.
As a result you are not blameless for not calling Uno. Strictly speaking, then, ignorance excuses only when it is itself blameless. 7 In sum, then, we want to propose the following account of blamelessness with respect to specific norms:
Norm-Specific Criticisability
An agent is prima facie legitimately criticisable relative to a specific norm N for ϕ-ing iff ϕ-ing violates N
Norm-Specific Blamelessness
An agent is blameless relative to a specific norm N for ϕ-ing iff
(1) ϕ-ing is permissible by N or (2) ϕ-ing violates N but the agent ϕs Since your act is permissible by moral and practical norms, it is blameless relative to these norms. Since you do not call Uno because you are blamelessly unaware that there is a rule requiring you to do so, you are blameless relative to this rule. Since these are all the rules that apply to your action in this case, your action is blameless relative to all specific norms that apply to it. So, it is all-thing-considered blameless.
Finally, an agent is blameworthy if and only if she is not all-things-considered blameless.
In sum, we want to propose the following:
All-Things-Considered Blamelessness
An agent is all-things-considered blameless for ϕ-ing iff
(1) ϕ-ing is all-things-considered permissible (that is, either fully permissible or permissible by all (non-overridden) overriding norms that apply to it) or (2) ϕ-ing is all-things-considered impermissible but the agent's ϕ-ing is blameless relative to all specific norms that apply to it.
All-Things-Considered Criticisability/Blameworthiness
An agent is blameworthy for ϕ-ing iff she is not all-things considered blameless for ϕ-ing.
It may be worth noting that, according to this account, criticisability occurs at the level of assessments by specific norms. In this way, it is fine-grained, as it were. In contrast, blameworthiness occurs at the level of all-things-considered assessments and so is coarse-grained. Blamelessness can occur at both levels.
This completes our normative framework for criticisability, blamelessness, and blameworthiness. We would like to emphasise once more that this is a perfectly general framework, in the sense that it applies to action in general. That said, in what follows, we would like to apply the framework to a particular type of act, to wit the speech act of assertion. More specifically, we will first look at a famous problem for KRA and then show that the above framework serves to offer an appealing solution to it.
II. AN APPLICATION: ASSERTION
II.1. The Case Against KRA. There is a prominent line of argument aiming to
show that KRA is mistaken. More specifically, it ventures to show that KRA's knowledge requirement on assertion is too strong. In order to achieve this, foes of KRA adduce cases in which a speaker is said to make a permissible assertion, whilst not knowing what they assert. Crucially, evidence that the assertion is permissible is supposed to reside in the fact that the relevant speakers are not deserving of criticism or alternatively that they are blameless. Here are some characteristic statements of the argumentative strategy:
I shall show that there are cases in which a speaker asserts that p in the absence of knowing that p without being subject to criticism in any relevant sense, thereby
showing that knowledge cannot be what is required for proper assertion. [S]he regards her duty as a teacher to include presenting material that is best supported by the available evidence, which clearly includes the truth of evolutionary theory. As a result, while presenting her biology lesson today, Stella asserts to her students, 'Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus,' though she herself neither believes nor knows this proposition." 13 In all of these cases, the agents are said not to be subject to criticism or not to be blameworthy. Since they violate KRA, it would seem that KRA makes incorrect predictions about these cases. Hence KRA is in trouble.
Before moving on, we would like to point out that, having mentioned cases of selfless assertion, we would like to set them aside for the remainder of this paper. The reason for this is that we are primarily interested in the normative framework from section 1 and the work it can do for champions of KRA. And while, as we are about to argue, the framework does offer an attractive treatment of cases involving assertions of justified false beliefs and gettiered beliefs, it does not serve to deal with cases of selfless assertions. Now, one might wonder whether this does not just mean that KRA stands refuted and that any positive results concerning the other problem cases for KRA the framework may deliver are of negligible interest. Fortunately, the answer to both of these question is no. The reason why the results of this section are not negligible is that cases involving assertions of justified false beliefs and gettiered beliefs are still widely considered to constitute one of the major stumbling stones for KRA. As a result, any In particular, they point out that when in doing something one breaks a norm because one
reasonably believes that what one does is permissible, then one is blameless. Since this is the case with agents in cases like FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS, these agents are blameless. These speakers assert what they assert because they reasonably believe that they know what they assert and, in consequence, that they are permitted to assert as they do. If so, it is reasonable for them to believe that they satisfy KRA. As a result, they are blameless when asserting as they do.
However, there are problems with this account. For instance, it may be that there are unsophisticated speakers who do not even have the concept of knowledge. They, too, may be in cases in which they assert justified false beliefs or gettiered beliefs. Since they do not have the concept of knowledge, they are not in a position to host reasonable beliefs about knowledge in the first place. As a result, the envisaged explanation of why agents in cases like FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS are blameless will not work here.
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At a more general level, foes of KRA worry that the above response is ad hoc.
Here is one very clear expression of this worry:
[A] general worry with excuse maneuvers is that they form very generic ways of immunizing proposed norms. Without a principled account of when an agent is excused, every counterexample to a norm may be rebutted by upholding that the agent is excused from violating the norm. As we have seen, the proponents of To begin with, recall that the framework distinguishes between norm-specific criticisability and blameworthiness. What we have seen is that, in cases like FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS, speakers are blameless for violating KRA in particular.
Moreover, in versions of the cases that might constitute a problem for KRA, they are also all-things-considered blameless (see footnote 9). But it is of course entirely compatible with this that speakers in these cases are criticisable for violating KRA. If it can be shown that they are, these cases will confirm KRA and disconfirm rival views according to which the speakers' assertions comply with the relevant norm. Now, it might be thought that it will be difficult if not impossible to ascertain whether the speakers in these cases are indeed criticisable for violating KRA. On second thought, however, the prospects are not so dim. Given that Norm-Specific Criticisability holds, we may expect that we may criticise the agent by pointing out that she violates N.
One way of achieving this, in turn, is by saying "You don't …!" where "…" specifies a requirement of the norm. This gives us
You Don't Criticisms
An agent whose ϕ-ing violates a specific norm N can be prima facie legitimately criticised by saying "You don't …!", where "…" is specifies a requirement of N.
For instance, in our toy case, we can with prima facie legitimacy criticise Uno players who do not call Uno when playing their penultimate card by saying: "You didn't call Uno!" or "You didn't say anything!"
Moreover, given that Norm-Specific Blamelessness holds, we may expect there to be a number of appropriate responses to "You don't …!" criticisms. For instance, the agent may disagree and maintain that she really does satisfy the relevant requirement and so her action is permissible, thus satisfying condition (1). Alternatively, she may offer an explanation to the effect that the norm was overridden by another norm (2.a), such that the action is all-things-considered permissible. We may also expect excuses pointing out (blameless) lack of control (2.b) or ignorance (2.c) to be an appropriate form of response.
And given that a norm was violated, it should come as no surprise that apologies constitute an appropriate form of response also.
Specific norms are thus associated with specific kinds of appropriate response. In particular,
Appropriate Responses
Prima facie legitimate "You don't …!" criticisms make a certain kind of response on the part of the defendant prima facie appropriate, including (i) "I did …!" rebuttals, (ii) explanations invoking overriding norms, excuses appealing to (blameless) (iii) lack of control or (iv) ignorance, and (v) apologies. Another prediction that we get is that in cases in which a prima facie legitimate "You don't …!" criticism has been levelled against a speaker, appropriate responses include "I do …!" rebuttals, explanations in terms of overriding norms, excuses appealing to (blameless) lack of control or ignorance, and apologies. And again this is exactly what we find. "I do know that!" is prima facie appropriate as is "He was going to shoot me if I had told the truth," "I couldn't help it," "I didn't know," and "I'm sorry." For instance, in both FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS, an apology and/or an excuse is entirely appropriate. It will be entirely appropriate to respond by saying "I'm sorry. I didn't know that." In this way, the putatively problematic cases for KRA, in conjunction with You Don't Criticisms and Appropriate Responses serve to confirm the assumption that KRA is true.
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With these points in play, we would like to look at actions that are not constrained by certain normative requirements. In particular, we would like to focus on action types that are not governed by a rule to the effect that one must: ϕ only if one satisfies C. We would like to suggest the following here:
Illegitimate Criticisms
If we criticise an agent who φs without satisfying C, perhaps by a "You don't …!" criticism, our criticism will be prima facie illegitimate. By way of response to this worry, note first that the fact that we frequently respond to "How do you know?" challenges by citing our evidence is just what we may expect if KRA is true. After all, given that "How do you know?" constitutes a challenge to a speaker's assertion, the speaker would want to provide some evidence that she knows what she asserted. But of course, one excellent way of achieving this is by offering her evidence for what she asserted. Suppose, for instance, that you assert that Obama cried during his speech on gun violence in January 2016, and we challenge your assertion by asking how you know. If KRA is true, your response to our challenge had better produce some evidence that you know that Obama cried during the speech in question. One excellent way of providing such evidence is by citing your evidence for it, say that you saw him crying on a TV broadcast of the speech. But given that citing our evidence is an excellent way of producing the kind of evidence "How do you know?" challenges call for, it will come as no surprise that we should frequently do so in response to such challenges.
22
What is more, it may be worth noting that "How do you know?" challenges are standardly taken to support KRA. 23 After all, these challenges do presuppose that the speaker knows. If KRA were not in place, it is hard to see why this presupposition should be legitimate and why assertions should be challengeable in this way to begin with. In view of these considerations, we do not think that the fact that we frequently respond to "How do you know?" challenges by citing our evidence disconfirms KRA.
But perhaps the point is a slightly different one, to wit, that the fact that we frequently respond to "How do you know?" challenges by citing our evidence provides reason to believe that, at the end of the day, "How do you know?" challenges are really nothing more than "What's your justification?" challenges. That might be a bit more troublesome for champions of KRA as, on this assumption, all that may be presupposed by these challenges is that the speaker has justification for what she asserted.
Fortunately, there is reason to believe that even this way of interpreting the objection will not refute KRA. To see why, note first that since knowledge entails justification, on KRA, we may expect that we can challenge assertions by challenging the speaker's justification. In order to turn this into a genuine problem for KRA, it would additionally have to be shown that assertions cannot be challenged in any of the other ways KRA would predict. And this is exactly not what we find. On the contrary, we can also challenge assertions by asking: "Is that really true?" or "Do you really believe that?"
Moreover, we can also challenge them by querying whether the speaker's epistemic environment is not inhospitable. For instance, Wendy's assertion that there is a barn in the field can be challenged by saying: "But isn't this the part of the country that contains nearly only fake barns?" (In fact, given that assertions can be criticised by saying "That's false!" and so on, it is unsurprising that it should also be possible to challenge them in these ways.) So, even if "How do you know?" challenges did ultimately boil down to "What's your justification?" challenges, this fact again does not serve to disconfirm KRA.
Here is another potentially troublesome datum for KRA. Suppose, before there was widespread consensus among expert scientists on the reality of global warming, you assert that global warming is happening and we criticise your assertion by saying: "You Fortunately for champions of KRA, there is reason to think that your response does not constitute a legitimate rebuttal of our criticism. To see why, note first that assertions that go unchallenged become part of the common ground of the conversation afterwards, as do assertions such that any challenge/criticism has been successfully met.
If so, and if, in the above exchange, your response to our criticism is indeed a legitimate rebuttal, we may expect that the proposition that global warming is happening to become part of the conversation's common ground thereafter, at least assuming, as we may, that neither the original assertion nor the subsequent rebuttal are subject to any further challenges or criticisms. Crucially, however, this is not what is happening here. To see this, note that (i) subsequent assertions in the conversation cannot be defended by referring back to the proposition that global warming is happening, not even if they are obviously entailed by it. Moreover, (ii) attempted such defences can themselves be legitimately rebutted. For instance, suppose at a later stage you were to assert:
"Temperatures on Earth are on the rise." Suppose that we also criticised this assertion and that you attempted to defend your assertion by referring back to the earlier assertion that global warming is happening, for instance by saying: "But didn't we already say that global warming is happening?" We could rightly point out here that the answer is negative: "No, all that we said was that there is good reason to believe that global warming is happening." There is thus reason to believe that the proposition that global warming is happening does not become part of the common ground after our exchange.
But if your response to us had been a legitimate rebuttal, it would have done so. As a result, there is reason to believe that your response did not constitute a legitimate rebuttal.
Finally, there is another, more attractive interpretation of what is going on in our exchange. Rather than constituting a legitimate rebuttal of our criticism, your reply involves both a concession "Well okay…" and subsequent weakening "There is good reason to believe that global warming is happening" of the assertion. This interpretation avoids the problem of its competitor. After all, it at most predicts that the proposition that there is good reason to believe that global warming is happening becomes part of the conversation's common ground, which seems unproblematic. At the same time, this interpretation does not generate a problem for KRA. This is because if we drop the claim that your response constitutes a legitimate rebuttal of our criticism, we no longer have any reason against KRA's key claim that permissible assertion requires knowledge. On the more plausible interpretation of the case, then, KRA walks free once again.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a normative framework featuring detailed accounts of both norm-specific and all-things-considered criticisability, to wit, Norm-Specific
Criticisability, Norm-Specific Blamelessness, All-Things-Considered Blamelessness, and
All-Things-Considered Criticisability/Blameworthiness. We then turned to a specific type of action, the speech act of assertion. In particular, we focused on a popular proposal concerning the epistemic norm of assertion, to wit, KRA, and a prominent objection to this view. The thought here is that cases of assertions on justified false belief and on gettiered belief show that KRA is too strong as the speakers violate KRA whilst, intuitively, walking free of blame. We have shown that our normative framework predicts that, whilst the speakers in these cases do indeed violate KRA, they do so blamelessly. In this way, we have shown that the standard response that champions of KRA have offered when presented with these counterexamples is borne out by our normative framework. As a result a prominent worry concerning the ad hoc-ness of this response can be dispelled.
Finally, we have argued that the putative counterexamples not only fail to provide evidence against KRA. On the contrary, once we take into consideration the patterns of criticisms and responses characteristically associated with action types that are/are not governed by rules like KRA, we find that these cases confirm KRA. In this way, the argument from these cases that foes of KRA have run against KRA can be turned on its head. Rather than posing a threat for KRA, they serve to strengthen the case for KRA. argumentative strategy pursued in that paper. Its key aim is to offer an account of the normativity of assertion that derives from its function. In particular, it is argued that assertion has the etiological function of generating knowledge in hearers. Etiological functions have normative import. In particular, they give rise an evaluative norm according to which a token of type T with the etiological function of producing effect E is a good T if and only if it has the disposition to produce E by functioning normally when in normal conditions. Since the etiological function of assertion is to generate knowledge in hearers, we get the result that a good assertion is one that has the disposition to generate knowledge in hearers by functioning normally when in normal conditions. It is easy to see that, even though selfless assertions violate KRA, they are still good assertions on this account, which accommodates the problematic intuition.
NOTES
It may also be worth noting that the same is not true of assertions of justified false beliefs and of gettiered beliefs. That is why the present paper is still essential towards a successful defense of KRA.
15 Mikkel Gerken, "Warrant and Action," Synthese, CLXXVIII, 3 (2011): 529-47, in sections 4-5. 16 Ibid., at p. 544. 17 If this is not immediately obvious, note that you may know that you have not been filled in on all the rules of the game yet and are taught various rules as you go along. 18 Finally, note that we have so far argued that agents in cases like FAKE SNOW and FAKE BARNS are blameless for violating KRA in particular. One might wonder whether they are also all-things-considered blameless. As a first observation, note that even though the question does indeed arise, the key point for champions of KRA is surely that speakers in the problem cases violate KRA blamelessly. With this point in play, there is every reason to believe that, on any version of the relevant cases that stands a chance of working as counterexample to KRA to begin with, the speakers come out as all-things-considered blameless as well. After all, it is important that speakers in these cases are intuitively not deserving of criticism or are blameless for their assertions. However, if speakers are indeed not deserving of criticism/are indeed blameless, the cases had better be described such that speakers do not violate any other ! norms governing the assertion. If they did violate other norms of assertion, the key intuition that speakers are not deserving of criticism/are blameless will be compromised. Given that this is so, on any version of the cases such that they are in the ballpark for constituting counterexamples for KRA, speakers will turn out not only blameless relative to KRA, but also all-things-considered blameless. 19 Williamson, "Knowledge and Its Limits," op. cit. 20 Again, it may be worth pointing out that it makes perfect sense for us to allow for criticisms of assertions that fall short of knowledge. Assertions have an etiological function, to wit, the function of generating knowledge in others (Kelp, "Assertion: A Function First Account," op. cit., recall also fn.7). It is of some importance that assertions fulfil this function reliably. If they are too unreliable at generating knowledge in hearers, they will stop generating knowledge in hearers altogether. Allowing for criticisms of unknown assertions contributes to ensuring the reliability of assertion's fulfilling its etiological function. To see this, notice first that, in the vast majority of cases, an assertion will generate knowledge in hearers only if the speaker also knows what she asserts. In other words, cases in which assertion generates knowledge are the exception and cases in which it transmits it are the rule. Moreover, hearers who are otherwise prepared to form a testimonial belief on the basis of a speaker's say-so will refrain from doing so when the speaker has been criticised for asserting what she does not know. When Williamson asserts that it is snowing outside and you criticise his assertion in the way just outlined, I will not form a belief that it is snowing outside even though I otherwise might have. Your criticism has prevented me from forming a belief that falls short of knowledge, thus contributing to ensuring that assertion reliably fulfils its etiological function of generating knowledge in hearers. See Kelp, "Assertion: A Function First Account," op. cit. for a detailed explanation of why assertion should be governed by KRA in terms of this etiological function. 21 Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing these objections to our attention. 22 Incidentally, we are not so sure just how frequently we actually do respond to "How do you know?" challenges by citing our evidence. To see this, note that one perfectly legitimate response you may give in the Obama case is that you saw the speech on TV. It is hard to deny, however, that the fact that you saw
Obama give a certain speech on TV is not evidence for the proposition that Obama cried during that speech. Rather, your evidence for this is that you saw him crying during the speech. But that is not what you offer in response to the challenge. What is going on here is that you cite the source of your belief that
